I attended the US vs. Belgium game in person. The performance was so incredibly bad it’s hard to think about calmly, but I’d like to offer one observation I haven’t seen anywhere else.
Starting in September last year, Poch has been using a 4-2-3-1 (on defense, shifting to a back three on attack). Before then, he had been experimenting with both formation and personnel; as the cup approached, while the personnel changed, the formation was determined.
Yet the US came into the Belgium game with two up top and a single withdrawn midfielder. I had seen the lineup announcement before the game, and assumed it was a mild form of misdirection. But that was indeed the formation; as had happened before, the lack of a withdrawn midfield pivot left space behind the press which Belgium quickly, repeated, and quite decisively exploited. After the second goal, the US shifted to the expected 4-2-3-1 and were immediately more competitive.1 I believe that after the formation shift, the US played to a 2-1 loss, and one of the goals we conceded was – wait, I forget. Wasn’t one of those goals a terrible blunder? I just don’t remember, thank goodness.
So why the hell did they start with two up top? I think I know, and it was an unfortunate but understandable decision.
Consider this: Poch appears to be a very meticulous coach. He plans his tactics carefully, well in advance, and drilled the team thoroughly on how to execute. Consider the difference between the underlapping runs that exposed Uruguay to the wide play that penetrated behind Australia; the team knew how to find the game, and did so successfully.
But there’s another wrinkle, here. Poch had tried to be flexible in his tactics between games, and the players were not capable of adjusting quickly. For example, in the first game against Japan in September (iirc) he tried to get the team to use a “Lassa Lita Lavoe Piana”2 to transition from the back four in defense to the back three, and it really really did not work. They couldn’t do it effectively. Then he adapted to the simpler “safe build” approach, and it’s been working. I think Poch learned that he need to be very directive in his tactics; the team wasn’t savvy enough to adapt quickly without significant practice.
Now consider that leading up to the Belgium game, Poch did not expect to have Balogun available. With Pepi up top, a 4-4-2 makes sense. Both strikers can finish, but Pepi is more of a false nine, better at hold-up and delivery than creative playmaking. Balo is very creative on the ball and can make goals individually. So advancing Pulisic into the center next for Pepi to combine with makes a certain amount of sense. I’m certain the US had drilled thoroughly how to play that way in the lead up to the game.
And then 33 hours before kickoff, Balo was cleared to play.3 And while I like Pepi, not many would make the case that he should start when Balo’s available. So now Poch has a real dilemma:4 does he shift to a 4-3-2-1 to best fit Balo’s skill set? Or does he stick with the formation he has prepared the team to play, with both Balo and Pulisic up top, to be sure the team will be able to execute his tactics?
Clearly, he chose the latter. He didn’t have enough faith in his team’s ability to adapt; he chose to play the wrong formation for the personnel he head on the field. And that decision turned out to be catastrophic. But at least now I can (pretend to) understand how he got there!
I will reiterate that I’m not suggesting he should have started Pepi. But Poch should have adjusted back to the tactics that had been working. I will also note that I’m not claiming that alone would have been enough to see the US through; Belgium adjusted some personnel and showed up playing at a different level than the US. But I do think it would have been enough to change a woeful, dispiriting loss into a hard fought battle we could have taken some pride in.
I enjoyed being proud of the team. Really sorry it had such an abrupt and – I have to say it – I’m really sorry we are left with such a deeply, sadly, familiar feeling of disappointment and dismay.
- Not a lot more competitive, though. There were a lot of problems with the US performance against Belgium. I suspect the players were overconfident. The Belgium team that showed up was not the team we saw against Senegal; this Belgium team came to play hard. Also, there were a pair of absolutely howlingly bad plays; the error by Freese ranks among the most terrible plays ever at the World Cup. ↩︎
- This is a brilliant explainer of the subtle differences in how to shift; I won’t explain it here. ↩︎
- I’m not weighing in on the clear, horrifying corruption this exposes. Screw Infantino for being so corrupt he doesn’t even bother to hide it. Screw Trump for getting his awful Trumpstank all over this tournament. But I can feel both of those things and root for the players on the field anyway. They didn’t ask for any of this, nor did any of the US fans. Please don’t bother accusing me of hypocrisy; I’m not interested in engaging in that. ↩︎
- I dismiss the definition of dilemma as a “hard choice.” I mean Dilemma, in the Shakespearean sense, a problem that has no good solution: you must leave your love, or they will die – no matter your choice, you lose. ↩︎
